January 20, 2006; update 9/3/2006
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Jackson Papers - Vestris Index
Scanned image files and OCR text files of Jackson family papers related to sinking of the Vestris and loss of E. A. Jackson, his wife J. B. Jackson and son Carey on November 12, 1928. The narrative in the May 24, 1932 Decision on the Merits indicates that this was a case of about everything that could be done wrong to save the ship actually being done wrong.
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Vestris news photo from Judson Jackson's scrapbook.
Note the life boats that have not been launched. With a list of this magnitude launching boats is very difficult and hazardous. There is some indication Jannette B. Jackson was in one of the women's boats that became stuck on the "upside" hull and was smashed by a falling boom killing many just before Vestris went down, drowning the rest. That was one of the first boats loaded, but became stuck as described in the letter from William P. Adams.
There was considerable scandal. Time, National Affairs, November 26, 1928:
Quietly sank the Vestris, a fortnight ago, some 250 miles east of Hampton Roads, in water two miles deep, beyond hope of recovery. There was no collision, no explosion, no hurricane. She was scuttled, perhaps by negligence.
Not one of the 13 children aboard, and only eight of the 33 women, survive.
Hysterical survivors filled the press with stories of leaking lifeboats, faulty tackle, indifference of officers, mutinous and incompetent crew. Capt. William J. Carey went down with his ship; but those who watched him on the bridge, taciturn, deaf to questions and pleas, wonder why he deferred SOS until 20 hours after danger became apparent.
The same article noted "Because shipments of gold, sometimes valued at as much as $3,000,000, were often sent on her between Argentine and New York banks, she was referred to as 'the Gold Ship.'" There was some speculation about scuttling for insurance. Race came into play. Most of the crew were from the British West Indies, Barbados in considerable part. They apparently were largely laborers instead of seamen and the officers were reported to be poor leaders. Early reports were of the crew shoving passengers out of life boats and virtually rioting. My reading of later investigations indicates these reports were exaggerations, though there were some nasty incidents.
The article also contains a common misconception that is found in almost every Vestris reference. All indicate the ship was "off the Virginia coast" as if this were the closest coast or shelter. The common feeling in the family was that being on the Virginia Beach boardwalk was as close as one could get on land to the disaster site. The Old Coast Guard Station in Virginia Beach is one of the few places featuring the Vestris disaster. The site is east of the Virginia coast, roughly due east of Cedar Island on Virginia's Eastern Shore. That is not the closest land. See the illustrations below.
The May 24, 1932 Decision on the Merits, probably the best considered position, states that "At about 2.30 p. m. the Vestris capsized and sank in Lat. 37° 38' N, Long. 70° 23', which is about two hundred miles off the Virginia Capes." The best position of the day is likely to be several miles off, but this is probably the best available. The Vestris site is closer to the boardwalk of Atlantic City, New Jersey, than Virginia Beach by roughly fifty nautical miles. The Narrows, through which she passed leaving New York, Atlantic City, the Delaware Bay entrance and Ocean City, Maryland are all closer than any point in Virginia. The closest one can approach the site of the sinking on land is somewhere along the beach in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
This Mapsource display shows the probable intended route. The positions noted as "EAJ-" with a date are those recovered from a diary kept by Ernest A. Jackson on his 1899 voyage to Brazil aboard Lamport & Holt's Hevelius. He noted that departure with "Left Lamport and Holt pier Brooklyn on board the Hevelius 2611 tons at 1 p.m., June 5, 1899. In stateroom 5 & 6" and followed with daily notes. The family had a long tradition with Lamport & Holt that continued even after the Vestris until the line's name vanished from shipping entirely.
Approximate distances from Vestris position to land
Some Ship Disasters and Their Causes by K. C. Barnaby, published by Hutchinson, 1968, London, contains a review of the core issues. It notes Vestris caused a change in British law. Corporate officers ashore meddled with decisions at sea that were supposedly reserved to the ship's captain. Captain Carey and others of the line were under strict orders, on pain of immediate dismissal, not to enter port off schedule and to avoid salvage liability at all costs.
The British Board of Trade's court of inquiry found written instructions stating "'In case of a serious disaster happening to a vessel of this line, the master must in the first instance carefully consider the actual amount of peril there may be for the lives in his care and then judge whether he is not justified in fighting his own way to the nearest port unaided. His ability to succeed in this will always be considered as a matter of high recommendation for him as a master." This was probably an effort to avoid salvage claims and one reason for the delay in sending a distress call. They were hoping a northbound sister ship would arrive in time to assist.
There were many "causes" of the disaster, some noted by the same inquiry as reported in Time on August 12, 1929: "Plimsoll line was 7½ in. under water" and "hatches were not properly battened down, her ash ejectors leaked, her pumps were inefficient," but the root cause of the loss of ship and lives was the refusal to seek shelter only some 217 nautical miles away. Instead, Carey waited. He waited while the engines and pumps struggled and failed. He waited from early Sunday morning when water was pouring into the coal bunkers and engine room until the ship was beyond ability to safely launch boats on Monday afternoon to take any real action. The changed law made it clear that decisions of safety at sea were the ship's captain, not corporate officers sitting safely ashore. That was a major contribution of this disaster to safety at sea.
A number of bodies were found with life jackets floating face down. Those reports led to the other Vestris influence on safety at sea, lifejackets that held the wearer's head face up.
Personal Letters and Photos
Last letter from Jannette Jackson from aboard Vestris to her son Judson
Inquiry to survivors for news about the Jacksons
Responding Survivor Letters
E. Lehner: Page 1 Page 2
William P. Adams (sketches of ship & detail of boats destroyed)
Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5
See "The Adams Ranch" for some background on the author of the letter.
Letters from wives of two "celebrated automobile racers" lost in Vestris
Newspaper clipping in J. G. Jackson's scrapbook about drivers
Mrs. Earl F. DeVore: Page 1 Page 2
Marion C. Batten (Supported her husband, Norman K. Batten, in water until he died.)
Campbell Kellman letter from Barbados, BWI: Page 1 Page 2
This letter has particular family interest as it describes Ernest Jackson's use of a Brazilian nut for stomach problems. He had serious stomach problems from youth and had described a radical change in diet in an attempt to help as early as his twenties. According to his son Judson Jackson this nut was given to him in one of the Indian villages after he indicated he could not eat freely because of these problems. He was told to eat some of the nut and his stomach would not bother him. Apparently it was so effective that he carried it everywhere for years. This letter confirms that he took a supply during the U. S. furlough from which he was returning on the fatal Vestris voyage. There is no record of what this nut might be. It is interesting that Mr. Kellman notes that it was described to him as "quite difficult to obtain."
Captain Fred Sorenson: Page 1 Page 2
Called loss of life criminal neglect
From scrapbook:
News reporting those missing
News reporting the rescued
Legal Papers
Letter from lawyers Hunt, Hill & Betts
December 20, 1932
Committee of Proctors
November 23, 1932
Letter from lawyers Hunt, Hill & Betts
June 1, 1932
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
VESTRIS - DECISION ON THE MERITS
May 24, 1932
PETITION OF THE LIVERPOOL, BRAZIL & RIVER PLATE STEAM NAVIGATION CO., LTD. AND LAMPORT & HOLT, LTD. FOR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY, AS OWNERS OF THE S. S. VESTRIS.
Scan of the decision text
Cover page image
Most descriptions of the Vestris disaster today mention weather, the storm, as the primary cause. That is not supported by the extensive technical review undertaken for this decision:
"I think the weight of the testimony regarding the weather conditions justifies the conclusion that the weather alone, which was not exceptionally severe for that season of the year, is not an adequate explanation of the loss of the Vestris and that her loss was the result of a combination of conditions and events, no one of which alone would have caused it."
Anyone seriously interested in the disaster should pay close attention to the technical details gathered in the course of making this decision.
Letter from lawyers Hunt, Hill & Betts
December 3, 1931
Page 1
Page 2
Suit by estate of Jannette B. Jackson
July 29, 1929
Page 1
Page 2
Page 3
Page 4
Page 5
Page 6
Page 7
Page 8
Page 9
Page 10
Page 11
Go to Ramon Jackson's Ship pages
Copyright Notice
Legal papers and scrapbook images are believed to be public domain due to public nature or age.
Images of personal letters are first published here and
Copyright © 2006 Estate of Judson G. Jackson
All rights to those images so marked are retained by the estate.
Original text on this index page Copyright © 2006 Ramon Jackson